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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
TARA SCOTT and WILSON CARTER, ) 
INDIVIDUALLY and AS TRUSTEES OF ) 
THE BAILEY MIDDLETON CARTER ) 
2009 TRUST, THE MARY WILSON ) 
CARTER 2009 TRUST, and THE ) 
WILSON M. CARTER 1988 TRUST, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
JOHN J. CARR and ) 
JOHN MATTHEW DWYER, TII, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Civil Action 
File No. 20 l 7CV297083 
Bus. Case Div. 2 
ORDER ON CERTAIN PENDING MOTIONS 
The above styled matter came before this Court on June 28, 2018 for a hearing on all 
pending motions. Having considered the relevant portions of the record as it pertains to each of 
the pending motions, the Court finds as follows: 
(1) Plaintiffs' Motion to Substitute 
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-17, 9-11-20, and 9-11-21, Plaintiffs move to substitute 
Bailey M. Carter and Mary Wilson Carter, a minor acting through her next friend Wilson Carter, 
as party-Plaintiffs to replace the Bailey Middleton Carter 2009 Trust and the Mary Wilson Carter 
2009 Trust. 
O.C.G.A. §9-1 l-l 7(a) provides in part: 
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest ... No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time 
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has been alJowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the 
action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such 
ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the 
action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest. 
Further, under the Civil Practice Act, "(a]ll persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they 
assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the 
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law 
or fact common to all of them will arise in the action." O.C.G.A. §9-l l-20(a). 
Importantly, "[m]isjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action." O.C.G.A. 
§9-11-21. Rather, "[p [arties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any 
patty or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just." Id. See also 
Smith v. Vencare, Inc., 238 Ga. App. 621, 628-29, 519 S.E.2d 735, 743 (1999) ("O.C.G.A. § 9- 
l 1-15(a) must be read in pari materia with O.C.G.A. §9-11-21 when a new patty is added, 
dropped, or substituted for an existing party, and Leave of the trial court must be obtained to add 
a new party") (citations omitted). In considering requests for leave to add a party, "[fjactors to be 
considered include 'whether the new party will be prejudiced thereby and whether the movant 
has some excuse or justification for having failed to name and serve the new party previously."' 
Dean v. Hunt, 273 Ga. App. 552, 552-53, 615 S.E.2d 620, 622 (2005) (quoting Aircraft Radio 
Systems v. Von Schlegell, 168 Ga. App. 109, 111(2), 308 S.E.2d 211 (1983)). 
In the case at bar, Plaintiffs allege Defendants John J. Carr and John Matthew Dwyer 
violated state and federal securities laws and committed other torts when they solicited and sold 
Plaintiffs shares in Vantage Corporation ("Vantage"). Plaintiffs assert, inter alia, that at the time 
they were sold the Vantage shares: the stock was not a federal covered security, was not subject 
to an effective registration statement and was not exempt from registration; Defendants received 
direct or indirect compensation for their role in soliciting investments in Vantage but were not 
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registered as securities salespeople or as investment advisors; and Defendants made misleading 
statements of material fact or omissions when soliciting and selling shares to Plaintiffs causing 
Plaintiffs to suffer damages. 
Plaintiffs initiated this action on October 25, 2017. The original complaint names as 
Plaintiffs Wilson Carter as Trustee of the Bailey Middleton Carter 2009 Trust and the Mary 
Wilson Carter 2009 Trust (collectively the "Trusts"), among others, based on a Schedule K-1 
provided by Vantage naming the foregoing Trusts as shareholders. On March 15, 2018, 
Defendant Carr moved to dismiss the claims asserted by Carter as Trustee of the Bailey 
Middleton Carter 2009 Trust and the Mary Wilson Carter 2009 Trust for lack of standing, 
asserting the Trusts have never purchased Vantage stock; rather, according to the relevant Stock 
Subscription Agreements and corresponding Stock Certificates, Bailey M. Carter and Mary 
Wilson Carter each purchased Vantage shares in their individual capacities. On March 26, 2018, 
Plaintiffs filed the instant motion seeking to substitute Bailey M. Carter and Mary Wilson Carter 
in the place of the Trusts and contemporaneously therewith Plaintiffs submitted an Amended 
Complaint. 
Insofar as Bailey M. Carter and Mary Wilson Carter, individually, are the real parties at 
interest with respect to claims arising from their purchase of Vantage stock and whereas 
Plaintiffs relied on Vantage's K-1 when initially naming the Trusts as Plaintiffs and acted 
promptly to substitute the proper parties within 11 days of Defendant Carr raising an objection, 
the Court finds substitute is proper. Further, given the preliminary posture of the case and that 
the requested substitution does not materially alter the nature of the claims against Defendants or 
the relief sought, the Court discerns no prejudice which will result from the substitution. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion to Substitute is hereby GRANTED. 
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(2) Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
In Defendant Carr's Motions to Dismiss and Defendant Dwyer's Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings, Defendants assert, inter alia, that Plaintiffs have failed to articulate sufficient facts 
in their pleadings to state actionable claims and have failed to provide them fair notice of the 
claims asserted against them. 
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and 
warrants dismissal or judgment on the pleadings "only if. .. its allegations 
'disclose with certainty' that no set of facts consistent with the allegations 
could be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to the relief he seeks." 
Bush v. Bank ofNew York Mellon, 313 Ga. App. 84, 89, 720 S.E.2d 370,374 (2011) (quoting 
Benedict v. State Farm Bank, FSB, 309 Ga. App. 133, 134(1), 709 S.E.2d 314 (2011 )). 
Importantly, under Georgia's Civil Practice Act a complaint must contain "[a] short and 
plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' (O.C.G.A. §9-11- 
8(a)(2)(A)) and that statement "must include enough detail to afford the defendant fair notice of 
the nature of the claim and a fair opportunity to frame a responsive pleading." Benedict, 309 Ga. 
App. at 134. Further, "although most elements of most claims can be pied in general terms, so 
long as they give fair notice of the nature of the claims to the defendant, all allegations of fraud 
"shall be stated with particularity." Bush, 313 Ga. App. at 90 (quoting O.C.G.A. §9-11-9(b)). 
However, "when a plaintiff fails to conform to these [pleading] requirements, the proper remedy 
is a more definite statement, not a dismissal of the complaint or judgment on the pleadings, at 
least so long as the plaintiff is able and willing to amend his pleadings to conform to the statutory 
requirements." Bush, 313 Ga. at 90 (citing Hall v. Churchwell's. Inc., 243 Ga. 852,853,257 
S.E.2d 272 (1979)). 
Here, the Court finds Plaintiffs' Complaint and First Amended Complaint fail to meet the 
foregoing pleading requirements. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are ordered to amend their pleadings to 
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provide more defini te statements as to the factual allegations giving rise to their claims. At a 
minimum, Plaintiffs must articulate facts regarding when and how they were improperly 
solicited and induced to purchase Vantage shares by each Defendant, and Plaintiffs must state 
their allegations of fraud with particularity including the alleged fraudulent statements/conduct 
of each Defendant, respectively. 
Plaintiffs shall file their amended pleading no later than July 13, 2018. Defendants are 
ordered to file amended answers within thirty (30) days after service of the amended pleading. 
See O.C.G.A. §9-11-15(a). 
SO ORDERED this l 1 day of June, 
E. LONG, SENI 
Metro Atlanta Business Case Division 
Fulton County Superior Court 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
Served upon registered service contact through eFileGA: 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Attorneys for Defendants 
S. Lawrence Polk 
EVERSHEDSSUTHERLAND(US)LLP 
999 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 2300 
Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3996 
Tel: (404) 853-8000 
Fax: (404) 853-8806 
larrypolk@eversheds-sutherland.com 
Gregory J. Digel 
HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP 
1180 West Peachtree Street, NW, Suite 1800 
Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3407 
Tel: (404) 817-8500 
Fax: (404) 881-0470 
greg.digel@hklaw.com 
Counsel for Defendant John J Carr 
James D. Blitch IV 
BLITCH LAW, P.C. 
191 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 3285 
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1740 
Tel: (404) 221-0401 
Fax: (404) 221-0402 
jim@blitchlaw.com 
Counselfor Defendant Matthew Dwyer, Ill 
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